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Abstract: 
The ever increasing amount of personal data accumulated by companies offering innovative services 
through the cloud, Internet of Things devices and, more recently, social robots has started to alert 
consumers and legislative authorities. In the advent of the first modern laws trying to protect user 
privacy, such as the European Union General Data Protection Regulation, it is still unclear what are the 
tools and techniques that the industry should employ to comply with regulations in a transparent and 
cost effective manner. We propose an architecture for a public blockchain based ledger that can 
provide strong evidence of policy compliance. To address scalability concerns, we define a new type of 
off-chain channel that is based on general state channels and offers verification for information 
external to the blockchain. We also create a model of the business relationships in a smart home setup 
that includes a social robot and suggest a sticky policy mechanism to monitor cross-boundary policy 
compliance. 
SECTION I. Introduction 
Over the last few years, both the general public and legislators have become more aware of the wide 
extent to which personal data is being collected and used by novel cloud services and smart devices. 
Major reported breaches, such as the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica and the Equifax incidents, caught 
the public's attention and led some users to reconsider their online behavior (e.g. delete a social media 
account). On the legislative side, the European Union put into effect a new law called the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) in May 2018. GDPR recognizes eight new rights for data subjects and 
requires service providers to adhere to stricter data use practices. On January 1, 2020, the California 
Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (the “Act”) will take effect. The Act defines four consumer rights, 
regulates disclosures made to consumers and has similarities with GDPR, although it is more limited. 
Responding to the amounted pressure for better consumer privacy protections, companies are 
expected to spend significant resources in order to comply with the new regulations and avoid fines. 
However, at the technology level, it is not clear what kind of tools and techniques will provide the 
industry with solutions that are transparent, yet efficient and cost-effective. EU member countries 
have recently started enforcing GDPR fines, while companies that have not yet had enough resources 
to update policies and build new tools may choose to move out of a market or discontinue popular 
products that are hard to upgrade according to the new regulations. 
During the past year, most major consumer facing companies that operate with personal data, like 
Google, Facebook and Microsoft, have issued notifications regarding the changes to their privacy 
policy. Although GDPR only applies to EU citizens, major companies have announced that they will hold 
the same privacy standard for all of their users regardless of location. As before GDPR took effect, the 
consumer often faces the dilemma of consenting to their use of private data, with varying amounts of 
control over the data shared, or deny a service altogether. Well established companies are better 
positioned to persuade the user of the importance of the service over the sharing of private data. On 
the other hand, startups or companies entering a new market may face stronger resistance from the 
consumers. 
Our vision regarding the technical solutions that the industry should adopt to comply with privacy 
requirements, regulation or consumer driven, is guided by the following remarks: 
• We argue that some industry players will benefit from a public record of policy compliance that 
allows them to build reputation and gain consumer trust; 
• We argue that a data provenance view that (a) is constructed through the collective traces of 
multiple stakeholders, and (b) is undisputed by all involved parties is critical in proving 
compliance in cases where the data travels across administrative boundaries. 
In this paper, we describe the architecture of a blockchain based system that records activity digests of 
organizations operating on private data. We assume that each party has defined the privacy policy 
rules that should govern their organization's access to consumer data and is able to determine whether 
a specific action is a violation. We identify transaction verification as a critical problem when using the 
blockchain as the public ledger for non-cryptocurrency applications and design a new type of off-chain 
channel that allows two parties to approve or challenge specific data access before submitting a 
message digest to a public blockchain. The off-chain channel is employed to address the scalability 
limitations of blockchains. 
To motivate our design and support the second underlying premise of our vision, we present a model 
of the relationships that exist among the various physical and business entities involved in a home 
setting with a social robot and Internet of Things (IoT) devices. During the last decade, we have 
observed a rapid increase on the number of companies announcing the development of a product 
promoted as a social robot (e.g., Jibo, ElliQ, Olly, BIG-i, Zenbo). Such a robot is supposed to act as a 
personal assistant with a “personality” that makes it feel like a human companion [1]. A social robot is 
designed to reside in homes and has unprecedented potential to affect people's privacy. 
Therefore, a transparent and auditable public ledger recording an organization's performance on data 
protection seems desirable to the industry sectors in which information technology is a significant 
building block. The contributions of this paper are towards a two-fold vision: (a) achieving verifiability 
even when combining a blockchain with off-chain transactions, and (b) providing a mechanism for 
small and medium sized organizations to reduce the costs required for regulation compliance and 
increase the trust of potential clients. Although the proposed blockchain based mechanism is inspired 
by the challenges faced by industry and non-profit organizations in the area of policy compliance, it is 
more generally applicable. This mechanism could be employed to increase the scalability of any 
blockchain based system, such as cryptocurrencies and smart contracts. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes influential related work. Section 
III presents the complicated business relationships in a smart home environment with IoT devices and 
a social robot acting as the central controller. Section IV discusses the privacy issues raised in such a 
smart home environment. Section V presents the architecture of a dependable public ledger for policy 
compliance, which is our main contribution. Finally, Section VI offers concluding remarks and ideas for 
future work. 
SECTION II. Background and Related Work 
A. Verification in a Blockchain Public Ledger 
The blockchain (BC) is a promising technique to implement a public ledger in that each user can view 
and verify the transactions published on a BC network. Any transaction is confirmed and accepted by 
all nodes in the network via a mining process. During this process, the transaction is added into a block 
that is finalized by a proof of work. Once a transaction is confirmed in this manner, there is high 
probability it is immutable. This desirable property stems from the fact that any new block is generated 
from the hash of a previous block. Thus, changing a historical block would need to be accompanied by 
regenerating all following blocks as well [2]. A successful attacker would have to control a significant 
portion of the computational power of the network. An attacker with 50% of the mining power will 
succeed in forking the BC with positive probability [3]. Several copies of the entire BC are kept by some 
nodes in the network, thus the BC inherently introduces data redundancy. 
The success of BC in cryptocurrency [2], [4] relies not only on its technical design, but also on its 
incentivizing strategy for encouraging correct behaviors. In Bitcoin, the most successful BC application, 
honest miners receive financial rewards. Misbehaviors, such as forking the BC or selfish mining, 
increase the risk of mined blocks being discarded, which means decreased revenues. Misbehaviors are 
also discouraged by the fact that if the market is dominated by such misbehaviors, the market 
confidence will be impacted, and thus the value of the currency will be diminished [3]. 
Considering the Bitcoin application, the network verifies transactions to determine whether an address 
owns enough coins to complete a transfer. What will be included in the blocks are the transfer of coins 
or the generation of new coins. In other words, the Bitcoin “space” is closed. Coins cannot be injected 
into the network from the external world. The only source of coins is the mining process. There are no 
transactions that transfer coins which are not derived from mining. The “coin”, or its equivalent, is the 
only verifiable object in a BC. The BC does not provide any tools for verification of external information. 
For example, if we publish weather records on the Bitcoin network, the nodes cannot verify the 
weather information we provide through the transaction. What the nodes do is to verify if there is 
enough coins to pay the transaction fee and accept any other information carried by the transaction 
submitted. 
Ethereum [4] allows the BC network to execute arbitrary user scripts as smart contracts with a fee, 
which enhances the ability of verification. However, the validity of external information still depends 
on the reliability of the information source. In a smart contract implementation, Hawk [5], an 
additional private layer is introduced to verify the external proof of contract compliance, where the BC 
only takes money transfers as transactions. Therefore, though an external message can be included in 
BC and is immutable once finalized, such a message is not necessarily reliable, since it can be an 
arbitrary string and the BC network cannot verify it. 
Another problem related to the verification of the transactions is the immutability of historical records. 
The immutability is a desirable property for a ledger in that the finalized records are supposed to be 
reliable. However, it could be problematic regarding the technical environment specified by the BC 
network. Consider a scenario in the weather recording case: an incorrect record is published to the 
ledger. Because the BC network is not able to verity its correctness, the wrong information would be 
accepted other than detected. In this case, the immutability of the BC will obstruct efficient corrective 
actions: records can not be modified in an append-only ledger. One way to correct wrong information 
is to announce a replacement of the incorrect record. This method is flawed in two aspects: 1) it 
wastes the expensive storage resource in the BC system (i.g both the incorrect information and its 
correction will be permanently kept in the BC and duplicated among the mining nodes); 2) It is difficult 
to reconstruct the correct records. 
Finally, the volume of data records poses scalability issues for a BC. Placing all records into blocks 
generates very frequent transactions that could disfunction a public BC network. For instance, it takes 
10 minutes on average for a Bitcoin block to be confirmed the transaction. Due to the randomness of 
the mining process, it usually takes longer to finish the transaction. For a Bitcoin transaction to be 
confirmed, it is expected to take an hour, and the overall throughput of the network is limited to 
around 7 transactions per second [6]. Existing solutions for scaling blockchains consider structures with 
off-chain databases and on-chain hashes, in which the reliability of the off-chain databases remains 
questionable. 
B. Off-Chain Payment and State Channel 
Off-chain payment channels aim to improve the scalability of BC cryptocurrencies for fast and frequent 
payment processing [7], [8]. In general, two parties deposit coins into a shared multi-signature address 
to open an off-chain payment channel. After opening, the two parties can make payments to each 
other through an agreement on the distribution of the deposit coins without generating any on-chain 
transactions. The agreement is in the form of a commitment transaction. For example, if Alice initiates 
a payment to Bob via an off-chain payment channel, she will sign a transaction indicating the final 
balance. This transaction is a commitment transaction which is not broadcasted to the network 
immediately. New payment will replace a preceded commitment transaction. At closure, the BC 
network will take the latest commitment transaction and redistribute the deposit coins. 
Unless one party could successfully forges the signature of its counterpart, a dishonest party is only 
able to cheat by posting an expired commitment transaction to close the payment channel. Therefore, 
any transaction for channel closure should be finalized after a timeout enough for the counterpart to 
react and potentially dispute. A proved cheater is punished economically in a way defined by the 
contract. 
A disadvantage of this original form of payment channels is that the payment channel is pairwise. Only 
the participants of the transaction that setup the payment channel could pay each other through it. 
Thus, a main stream of research on this area aims to connect existing payment channels into an off-
chain payment network. If Alice wants to pay Bob, they do not have to setup a payment channel 
between them, as long as there is a user (we may call her Chris) having payment channels with both 
Alice and Bob. Alice pays Chris, then Chris pays Bob. Any number of nodes can be added to the chained 
payment, thus any pair of users in this network could pay each other with establish additional 
channels. 
Another direction of payment channel research is to generalize it into a so-called state channel [9]. The 
participants of a state channel monitor and operate with some states in concern. In payment channels 
(which are specific cases of state channels), the interesting state is the deposit paid by the participants. 
The generalized state channel could accept any variables as the states. This scheme has the potential 
to broaden the adoption of BC application in areas other than cryptocurrencies, but this potential has 
not yet been adequately explored. Raiden is the most prominent project that implement state 
channels, but currently it focuses on the implementation of payment channels via this generalized 
framework. Besides the scalability improvement, the off-chain payment channel, or state channel, 
guarantees the reliability of external information by posing probable economic loss, if caught behaving 
dishonestly. 
C. Sticky Policy 
Policies can stick to data to define allowed usage and obligations as it travels across multiple parties, 
platforms, or administrative domains, enabling users to improve control over their personal 
information [10]. Sticky policy is a potential approach for accountable and enforceable 
policies [11], [12]. A similar idea has been used for tracking data flow within cloud 
infrastructures [13], [14]. A sticky policy adopts a data-centered approach that encloses allowed 
methods with the data object. This scheme could be further extended to define any allowed operation 
in the descriptor. Sundareswaran et al. proposes a logging system for data sharing following this 
paradigm [15]. In their work, the users' data is encapsulated with executable code in JAR files. 
There is a tradeoff between storage overhead and universal applicability of the sticky policy. For 
instance, consider a system for information flow control that uses a tagging mechanism to identify the 
policies applied to specific user data within a PaaS cloud [16], [17]. Since the policy recognition and 
enforcement system is embedded within the cloud infrastructure, the tag associated with the user 
data is light weight. However, this policy enforcement cannot be applied when data has to travel 
across the boundary of cloud infrastructures (e.g from EC2 to Azure). If the enforcement code is 
attached to the data [15], [18], the policy application can be ensured as the data travels through 
different cloud infrastructures at an overhead probably larger than the data in concern. Ideally, the 
most effective way to implement sticky policy is by a protocol standard in which a header is defined as 
the policy descriptor, and the processing methods are defined for the policy agent. We follow this 
paradigm in this paper and assume there is a standard policy descriptor attached to the user data. The 
corresponding policy agent is deployed through the entities involved in the service provision. 
D. Other Related Work 
Zhang et. al. categorizes the requirements for dependable, scalable, and pervasive distributed ledgers 
with BCs and identifies research challenges to achieve this objective [19]. One of the particular issues 
besides the scalability problem is the transaction privacy. Because of the transparency of the ledger, it 
is possible to construct an activity graph for a particular address. zkLedger [20] attempts to solve this 
problem for a public auditable ledger by hiding plain information via Pedersen commitment and non-
interactive zero-knowledge proofs. Shae and Tsai proposes an approach to transform blockchain into 
distributed parallel computing architecture for precision medicine [21]. Though different from the 
purpose of our scheme, it shares the same extension, i.e, to coordinate on-chain and off-chain 
computation. The core challenge is to keep the on-chain workload light weight. Their work depends on 
an off-chain control node that could help the on-chain program call off-chain arbitrary code to execute 
the main computation. This scheme is applicable when the entire computation is owned by a single 
organization. When multiple administrative parties are involved, the output from other participants 
may not be trusted and thus a verification process is necessary. There is discussion on the incentive 
mechanisms underlying the BC based cryptocurrencies [22], [23]. However, their analysis focuses on 
the explanation of how the existing schemes work rather than provide a quantified method to design 
incentive frameworks for different application scenarios. 
SECTION III. Relationship Model 
In this Section, we create a model that captures the complicated relationships between different but 
interrelated administrative authorities in a smart home setup that includes a social robot. Our purpose 
is to illustrate the administrative borders that data travels and motivate the need for a provenance 
data trace compiled from the various views of the involved parties for evaluating privacy policy 
compliance. 
In order to perform a risk analysis, we need to consider the ecosystem of service providers, devices, 
and policies within which the social robot operates. The behavior of the robot is typically controlled 
through artificial intelligence algorithms in a company's cloud platform, while the robot should also 
have access to other clouds such as those used by the user to store data (e.g., pictures, documents). A 
social robot is expected to act as a smart home central controller so that it will be communicating with 
IoT devices directly or indirectly. Currently, a privacy policy for a networked social robot does not exist 
and thus cannot be implemented globally nor audited to protect users in work, home and care 
environments. Additionally, security vulnerabilities of social robots have already been identified [24]. 
In the typical case, the social robot is not meant to be used in isolation, but in close communication 
with the robot manufacturer's cloud service. We understand the purpose of this tied connection to be 
three-fold. First, the robot can be marketed with more competitive pricing without sacrificing 
computing power, if the robot's hardware is not expected to run all applications, such as intensive 
artificial intelligence algorithms, but can “outsource” some of the computation to the cloud. Similarly, 
the robot's storage capacity does not have to be the limit on how many large files, e.g., video 
recordings, the user can create without running out of space. Some manufacturers could even offer 
cloud storage at an additional cost. Second, the manufacturer can collect interesting data about the 
robot use, if the robot is designed to regularly “call home” and write to the cloud's log files. Third, 
several of the social robot companies release software development kits (SDKs) for interested parties 
to create add-on robot skills - a concept similar to the creation of apps for smartphones. The robot's 
cloud could serve as a central place for downloading skills and storing their data. 
In Fig. 1, the robot manufacturer's cloud is depicted as cloud A. Apart from the robot's cloud that was 
just described, the user could also have the robot exchange data with other clouds. Examples include 
Dropbox, Google Drive, and Facebook. The robot's company might even allow users to download add-
on skills from platforms such as Google Play. In Figure 1, these types of cloud services are depicted as a 
cluster of 𝐿𝐿 clouds. 
 
Fig. 1. The relationship model with the social robot in a home setting. 
 
The social robot will be just one of the devices sending or receiving data from the group of 
those 𝐿𝐿 clouds. Smartphones, tablet and laptop devices found in a household today are often already 
connected to some of the 𝐿𝐿 clouds. In addition, the user might desire these personal devices to 
exchange data with the social robot. For instance, the robot could send pictures taken with its camera 
through the Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) or electronic mail. Some robots that are marketed 
not only as a friendly companion but also as a security patrol guard could also push alerts and videos of 
what they mark as unusual conditions. Similarly, the user might want to share information like the 
contacts address book from the phone or personal computer to the social robot. 
As smart home devices and IoT become even more prevalent, it is reasonable to assume that a home 
where a social robot is present will likely have a number of IoT devices as well. Examples of currently 
available smart home devices include smart thermostats, lights, and monitoring systems. Some of the 
IoT devices may be sending and receiving data to and from a cloud, which is operated by the device's 
manufacturer or a third party. This cloud collects information from the device's operation and can be 
used to configure the device dynamically. In Fig. 1, we assume that there are 𝑁𝑁 such IoT device-cloud 
pairs. Smart home devices often benefit from a central smart home controller. If a social robot exists in 
a home, it is positioned well to become this central controller. For example, if a smart conductivity 
sensor reports a nonzero value to the robot, the robot could check the sensor's surroundings and 
decide, if there is flooding, to wake up the homeowner. 
The introduction of a social robot in a home environment adds a significant degree of complication to 
the business relationships and network connections enabled in a smart home. Each of the mentioned 
clouds may be run by one entity as a Software-as-a-Service (SaaS), while a different administrative 
authority may be supplying the Platform or Infrastructure-as-a-Service (PaaS or IaaS). The same IaaS 
(e.g., Amazon Web Services) could at times be the layer below two different SaaS clouds (e.g., the 
social robot's cloud and an IoT device's cloud). Each of the devices, including the social robot, will have 
their license agreements with potentially varying privacy statements. Tracking the origin and 
provenance of data, and auditing the information needed to assure that privacy has been preserved 
can be a challenge with so many authorities involved. 
The communication among the devices illustrated in Fig. 1 could involve the cellular network, the 
Internet Service Provider's (ISP) network or a wireless local network (e.g. WiFi, Bluetooth Low Energy). 
Currently, many IoT devices do not provide encryption, and the data between such a device and a 
robot could travel through a network controlled by the Telecommunications Provider or the ISP in 
clear. Even if the data exchanged is encrypted, we should still consider whether the frequency (or 
other metrics) of the data traveling from the robot to the network and vice versa could by itself be 
revealing information. 
SECTION IV. Nontrivial Privacy Issues 
The increased capabilities of a social robot over a traditional IoT device necessitates a privacy policy 
and the ability to audit this policy across platforms and data transmission channels. These capabilities 
of the social robot include: move within the environment with precise positioning and orientation in 
multiple dimensions; listen in on a human conversation; watch human agents through video and 
computer vision capabilities; act on an environment with physical effectors (e.g. limbs). 
A privacy policy describes how a party collects, processes, shares, and manages a person's data and 
information legally. A person's private information contains anything that can be used to identify a 
person and can include things such as their name, address, relationship status, finances, health 
information and buying records. A privacy policy for social robots is required to provide a standard for 
the design and use of these social, physically mobile and capable, cyber-physical agents because they 
are inherently personal surveillance agents. A social robot lives in an ecosystem of IoT devices, cloud 
computing services, apps, and the Internet; a policy and methodology to audit and alert when privacy 
has been violated are required. The development of this policy will enable manufacturers, users, and 
computing and internet service providers a standard to manage risk and liabilities of interconnected 
social robots. 
While there is an ISO standard related to personal care robots to ensure the user's safety, currently 
there are no standards or policy to maintain the user's privacy. The GDPR is not specific to social 
robots, but has applicable elements. Among its provisions are the right of a person to access the exact 
information kept by a company regarding that person, and the right to request that all this data be 
permanently erased from the company's files. The GDPR includes significant penalties for those that 
are not found in compliance, but the exact long term impact it will have is currently unclear. 
Nevertheless, the GDPR marks a significant change in the global regulation landscape regarding the 
privacy of digital assets. 
The privacy policy and auditing methodology for social robots should take into account not only data 
artifacts but also the robot observations, inferences, and machine learning made from single- and 
crowd-sourced data that can violate one's privacy. 
While privacy policies enforce personal data protection in this ecosystem, they usually suffer from lack 
of transparency and auditability. Policy violation is observed by its consequence, e.g., disclosure of data 
that is supposed to be confidential. The procedure of the violation has rarely been reported. It is 
partially because the policy is usually a legal statement rather than a technical protocol that could be 
examined in detail by certain signals. Suppose a home robot with a webcam records and uploads a 
video stream in an unexpected way. The incident will be reported only when the house owner 
observes and recognizes this abnormality. Otherwise, such violation will go undetected. 
Policy violations incurred by a social robot consist of both visible actions and invisible computations 
and communications. For the purpose of transparency and auditability, it is not enough to just take 
only the result, or the consequence of the violation, into account. The whole process should be under 
examination. Firstly, some early signals of policy violation are contained in invisible activities. Secondly, 
transparency and auditability are not only for detecting intended malicious behavior, but also for 
examining unintended violations, so that improvement could happen, and knowledge could be shared 
with the community. In the meantime, operation logs that exist for debugging or troubleshooting can 
provide information for describing violations in detail. This information could serve as the data source 
for transparency and auditability. However, the log itself includes sensitive private data. The disclosure 
of the log's contents will put personal privacy at risk. 
From another perspective, transparency and auditability also require a permanent unchangeable 
record that tracks the historical performance of the market participants. On the one hand, it helps the 
public identify a reliable service provider; on the other hand, honest and well-operated providers could 
benefit from their efforts on policy compliance. 
Auditability is a hard problem in the cloud era, because of the rapid change of structure at the 
application level and at the underlying architecture level. The presence of a social robot stretches out 
new challenges, in that robots could perform sophisticated activities whose effect is difficult to 
measure. The activities of a social robot could be featured as a sequence of individual actions, which, in 
turn, requires a detailed record of the whole process of activity used for auditability. 
SECTION V. Dependable Public Ledger of Policy Compliance 
The previous sections have pointed out the research challenges in constructing a BC based distributed 
system for policy compliance. An average confirmation time of 10 minutes and 7 transactions per 
second pose scalability limitations on the growth of the BC as a audit log. What is more, the BC cannot 
verify information external to it. 
In this section, we consider a public auditable record of the policy compliance, which can serve as the 
permanent immutable credit record of the service provider for the customer. A well performing 
company could benefit from this public ledger by building a trusted reputation. As mentioned 
previously, the verification of external information is critical for BC based public ledger, especially in 
the scenario considered in this work, where the information published on the ledger should be reliable. 
We propose a mechanism called Verifiable Off-Chain Message Channel (VOCMC) that enables the 
verification of external information and the integration of BC with powerful off-chain computation to 
overcome the difficulty of scaling the BC. 
The VOCMC is derived from the state channel described in Section II-B. When disagreement occurs in 
an off-chain payment channel, the participants can simply close the channel. However, in the VOCMC 
we do not adopt this approach, but we preserve the information that leads to disagreements. We 
introduce a series of negotiations for the parties to resolve the dispute; if these negotiations fail, we 
still keep a record of the disagreement as a record of policy dispute. The VOCMC is a building block for 
the public ledger of policy compliance, which combines an off-chain database and an on-chain hash. 
We assume there exist a set of policies for each party and a mechanism that allows a party to 
determine whether an action on the data complies with the party's policies. We leverage the sticky 
policy introduced in Section II-C to track the user data and collect evidence. 
A. Incentive-Based Trust 
There are two kinds of security concerns related to off-chain payment channels. The first is that the 
deposit balance should be correct; the second is that the publication of the transaction indicating 
correct current balance state should be guaranteed. The state-of-art work focuses on the publication 
problem, i.e. how to guarantee the honest participants could publish the valid commitment 
transactions by the normal closure or by the dispute process, when the counterparts attempt to 
publish an outdated transaction to rollback the balance state. 
On the other hand, the correctness of state has not attracted enough attention, because the 
correctness of the states seems a natural property in cryptocurrencies. However, the correctness of 
information is not guaranteed in general applications. In a simple example suppose that Alice pays Bob 
10 USD for a sandwich, which can be described in a transaction in three different ways as show in Fig. 
2. Although the value of payment is correct in all three cases, the additional information provided by 
the comment may be correct, ambiguous, or absolutely ignored. 
 
Fig. 2. A: A transaction with comment describing the behavior related to this payment; B: The comment with 
partial information; C: Comment is ignored. 
 
In this scenario, Bob may have no reason to dispute a transaction that contains an ambiguous or empty 
comment, if the payment amount is correct. In off-chain payment channel, the protocol naturally 
ensured the correctness of the balance state, because the deposit balance is an incentive-associated 
information. The participants will automatically take care of the balance when reaching an agreement. 
However, in applications where the comment field describes information related to policy compliance, 
the involved parties should have an incentive to check the correctness of information. 
Although in theory the security of a BC network requires that none of the participants controls a 
dominant majority of the mining resources, in practice the formation of mining pools have has 
challenged this fundamental security assumption. Mining pools are groups of cooperating miners who 
agree to share block rewards in proportion to their contributed mining hash power [25]. By joining a 
mining pool, the miners are able to reduce the variance of their mining rewards. At the time of writing, 
the top three leading mining pools in Bitcoin hold over 51 % share of the computing resource; the 
biggest pool, BTC.com controls 29.6%. Most of the mining pools are concentrated in China with an 
estimated 81 % of the network hash rate [25]. With the presence of mining pools, Eyal and Sirer 
proposed the selfish mining strategy that allows a pool with one third of the overall hash power to 
obtain more revenue than its ratio of the total hash power [26]. 
Nevertheless, such attacks have not been observed. The pools have been benign and followed the 
protocol so far [26]. The assumption is that the majority miners may avoid strategies that earn more 
bitcoins but decrease the expected value of their future mining rewards, since a substantial share 
requires a significant investment to maintain [3]. 
In cryptocurrency, the participants' incentive is the reward of coins. In off-chain payment channels, the 
issue of penalties for misbehavior can be used as incentive instead of the reward process. Suppose that 
Bob pays Alice the correct amount, but files a transaction with a smaller value than expected. Alice will 
double check the transaction, then close the channel once she discovers this fraud. Bob may lose part 
of his deposit according to the contract. 
There is an additional factor contributing to the correctness of the states: the direct interest conflict 
between Alice and Bob. If the state is incorrect, one of the parties is likely to have the incentive to 
dispute the claim. Therefore, to protect their benefit from pillage, Alice and Bob have a strong 
motivation to carefully monitor the state. In our applications, the users and the service providers will 
typically hold opposite interests on data usage. Therefore, an incentive-based mechanism for policy 
compliance could be applied. 
B. Verifiable Off-Chain Message Channel (VOCMC) 
The VOCMC is established by 𝑛𝑛 parties who are concerned about the off-chain data that will be used 
for on-chain execution. We assume the n parties are users of a BC system where a type of 
cryptocurrency is defined and that each participant holds enough balance of the cryptocurrency in 
private addresses. Upon the establishment, the 𝑛𝑛 participants have to transfer some units of the 
cryptocurrency from their private addresses into a 𝑛𝑛 −of−𝑛𝑛 multi -signature address as the deposits. 
An 𝑛𝑛 −of−𝑛𝑛 multi-signature address requires 𝑛𝑛 signatures to authorize a transfer from this address. 
The channel is parameterized by (the pseudonyms of) the 𝑛𝑛 parties, 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖∈𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑃𝑃, and their 
deposits, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖∈𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝐷𝐷. At any time 𝑡𝑡, the deposit balance of a participant 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 is 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡. Denote any input to 
the VOCMC at time t before the expected finalization time 𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 as 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡,0≤𝑡𝑡≤𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸, the corresponding output 
to the BC network is Φ(𝑚𝑚0,𝑚𝑚1,⋯ ,𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡) that is generated from all the input till 𝑡𝑡 under method Φ(⋅). 
For convenience, we denote the output at time 𝑡𝑡 as Φ𝑡𝑡. If there is no disagreement on the current 
output, the parties sign a temporary on-chain transaction TernTran (𝑡𝑡,Φ𝑡𝑡) and each party 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 holds a 
copy TemTran (𝑡𝑡,Φ𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖). The message channel is either closed automatically at 𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 with the 
output Φ𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸  for on-chain execution, or closed by any party 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 submitting its copy of the latest 
temporary transaction TemTran (𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐,Φ𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 , 𝑖𝑖). The on-chain transaction can only be finalized after a 
timeout 𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇 enough for counterparts to potentially dispute. 
There is an incentive function Inc (𝑡𝑡,Φ𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) that redistributes the deposits according to the current 
output Φ𝑡𝑡 and actions related to it. When dispute occurs (e.g. pi cheats by submitting an obsolete 
temporary transaction), the latest valid TemTran (𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐,Φ𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 , 𝑖𝑖) will be accepted, and the deposit will be 
redistributed according to the predefined punishment policy, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ⇐ Inc(𝑡𝑡,Φ𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) If the channel is 
closed regularly, the deposit will be refunded or redistributed according to predefined 
agreements, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ⇐ Inc(𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 ,Φ𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 ,𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸−1). The dispute and the incentive functions are implemented by 
a smart contract carried by the temporary transactions. 
Different from the off-chain payment channel, there is a particular difficulty when applying state 
channel for data verification: a participant may intentionally refuse to sign a transaction with messages 
that may impact its benefit. To do so, the participant could refuse to sign and submit the latest valid 
temporary transaction to close the channel. Thereafter, the messages will never be published to the 
ledger. 
 
Fig. 3. State transition in vocmc. Negotiation reports indicate that the information might be unreliable, but the 
details could help the public make decisions by their own judgement. 
 
We introduce a negotiation procedure to address this issue as shown in Fig. 3. Once a participant 
refuses to sign a temporary transaction TemTran (𝑡𝑡,Φ𝑡𝑡), the counterpart could initiate a negotiation, 
Neg (𝑡𝑡,Φ𝑡𝑡,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖, 𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿), where 𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 is the deadline for the participant 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 responding to this negotiation. 
If 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 does not respond to the negotiation request, TemTran (𝑡𝑡,Φ𝑡𝑡) will be automatically signed. If the 
negotiation request receives response, but an agreement is not reached, the negotiation stays open 
with a new deadline for further negotiation. A VOCMC with open negotiations cannot be closed. If the 
participants do not reach an agreement after 𝑁𝑁 rounds of negotiation (the maximum of rounds 
allowed), a transaction with information of the negotiation proceedings NegTran ((𝑡𝑡 + 𝑁𝑁𝛿𝛿, 
Neg (𝑡𝑡,Φ𝑡𝑡,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖, 𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿))) will be automatically signed by every party and submitted to the public ledger. 
This transaction serves as a report of unsuccessful negotiations. The transaction of negotiation report 
does not reallocate deposits. Nevertheless, the negotiation report could be a helpful information 
source for other customers. 
The VOCMC effectively removes the scalability limitation when developing BC based applications, 
because the mechanism can accept any result of off-chain computation as input. If all the participants 
are honest, the BC network will only process on-chain transactions recording the opening and closing 
states of the channel with external information verified by the relevant parties. In the case of dispute, 
the reliability of the input for on-chain process is guaranteed. For the punishment to misbehavior, the 
VOCMC provides the flexibility to adopt any strategy that is proved by future research, or borrowed 
from other domain knowledge. 
C. The Public Ledger of Policy Compliance 
A data provenance view is required due to the cross-boundary problem introduced by the ever 
frequent storage and process outsourcing. Fig. 4 illustrates such an example. The application employs a 
social robot that receives oral instructions from a human and takes actions to complete tasks such as 
searching for music or traffic conditions. The robot is connected to a PC client and a mobile client for 
local configuration and control. The robot provider maintains a data warehouse for storage of the user 
data, and outsources the speech recognition to a SaaS provider specialized in natural language 
processing. The training data for the speech recognition model is acquired from the data warehouse. 
When the recognition model is ready, the robot could directly send realtime speech record to the SaaS 
for analysis. 
 
Fig. 4. High level description of the proposed scheme with example 
 
Our proposed scheme requires the user and the service provider to have already expressed privacy 
rules and intentions. We assume policy compliance inference engines are deployed at both the user 
side and the provider side. The scheme should ensure that the required evidence will be sent to both 
the inference engines. To achieve this goal, we recommend a sticky policy based framework to track 
the data footprint and enforce the policy application. Our sticky policy mechanism can be illustrated 
by Fig. 5 where part of the data flow from Fig. 4 is sketched. The user data will be accompanied by a 
policy descriptor during its entire life cycle including transmission, storage, duplication, processing, and 
deletion. The policy descriptor defines the applied policies, or allowed treatments. A policy agent will 
parse the policy descriptor to determine the policies and configure the execution environment. We do 
not require that the policy descriptor should carry the execution module, but assume that the 
mechanism for policy application is deployed within the policy agent at any cloud infrastructure 
involved in the service provision. In addition, the policy agent is required to have a communication 
mechanism that will send logging updates to the data owner and the service providers when the data 
is touched by any program. This log serves as the evidence feeding into the inference engines in Fig. 4. 
Because of its inherent flexibility, the sticky policy enabled scheme has the potential to be adjusted as 
policies require. The system also carries the following desirable properties: 
• Consistent cross boundary policy application. Since any copy of the user data is accompanied 
by a policy descriptor, it is straight forward to maintain a consistent set of applied policies when 
the data is moved to another sticky policy enabled domain. 
 
Fig. 5. The sticky policy mechanism that enables policy application and evidence collection in fig. 4 
 
• Global view of data distribution. A central problem for auditable policy compliance is tracking 
all the duplication of the user data within the cloud. Data may be copied for various purposes, 
such as backup, buffering, process outsourcing. Therefore, policy violations might happen not 
only by malicious behaviors, but also by misconfiguration. The sticky policy enabled logging 
mechanism could help discover all the intentional and unintentional duplications. 
• Fair availability of information for policy compliance inference. A critical feature of the 
VOCMC is the timeout δT. Before a hash of the transaction is inserted to the BC, participants 
are allowed to dispute it. The sticky policy mechanism should guarantee independent “push” 
notification for all the participants. Thus, all participants will be able to examine the transaction 
and make a decision. 
Fig. 6 outlines the high level design of our proposed public ledger of policy compliance. The logging 
mechanism independently provides evidence to the policy compliance inference engines on both the 
user side and the provider side. According to the outputs of the inference engines, the user and the 
provider reach agreement on compliance or violation. Finally, the hash of the agreement appears on 
the BC. 
We recommend that a public and not a private BC system is adopted for the ledger. There are two 
benefits associated with a public BC for policy compliance. First, the public record allows service 
providers to build trust with their customer base, especially in cases of startups and companies 
entering a new market. Second, the major benefit of a BC is its immutability with no trusted third party 
involved. This property depends on the assumption of the independency of the miners and the fact 
that no (group of) miner controls a dominant computing power. This assumption is easier to hold for a 
public BC, but not for private (or permitted) BC. The difficulty in adopting private BC as the ledger is 
that it essentially introduces a trusted authority. The private chain is owned by an organization and the 
miners have to get permission from the owner. Ricardo et al. [27] points out that the only feasible 
solution for BC based database with public auditablity is to utilize a private BC for the recording and a 
public BC for the checkpoint. We hold a similar point of view, but realize that the private BC is a 
replaceable component, as long as the checkpoint in public BC is reliable. In a setting where a BC is 
controlled by a trusted authority, the performance of the BC has to be compared with other 
distributed database systems. 
 
Fig. 6. The structure of the public ledger: Off-Chain database, on-Chain hash 
 
As illustrated in Fig. 6, there are two levels of off-chain databases: i) the database of evidence collected 
by the sticky policy mechanism, ii) the database of policy compliance, which contains the outputs of 
the inference engines. The user and the provider reach agreement on both the updates to the policy 
compliance database and the renewed hash of the database. Note that only the hash is present in the 
VOCMC, because by definition the agreements obtained in the VOCMC will be in form of temporary 
transactions that would be published on the public BC. As already mentioned, we follow the structure 
combining an off-chain database and an on-chain hash, thus only the hash could be included in the on-
chain transactions. The policy compliance database can be maintained by the service provider or a 
third party similar with the TransUnion® structure for personal credit record. 
D. VOCMC Setup for Public BC 
Suppose the Bitcoin or EthereuBC is the ledger for the on-chain transactions. The user and the provider 
transfer deposits into a 2-of-2 multi-signature address to open a VOCMC for pairwise recording. The 
deposit could be part of the payment for the service provider, which would be transferred to the 
provider's address at the end of the service provision according to the incentive model. The incentive 
model is implemented by the smart contract. Every time an update to the database arrives, all the 
parties should sign a temporary transaction that contains the hash of the renewed view of the 
database, if an agreement is reached on the updated states. Regarding the finalization, the channel is 
closed when finalizing a record with redistribution of the deposit. The reason for the decision is firstly 
that the on-chain cost is almost the same no matter what kind of transaction is processed, and 
secondly that finalization could be caused by dispute where deposit must be redistributed. If the 
finalization is triggered by the timeout 𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 and the service continues, the deposit will be transferred to 
another 2-of-2 address as opening another VOCMC. 
 
Fig. 7. High level description of the public ledger with example of continuous service 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the ideal case in which all the participants are honest. The VOCMC output to the BC 
periodically sets checkpoints on the chain. During the finalization, smart contract for the incentive 
model would be executed by the miners at the cost of the service provider 1. 
E. Anonymity 
The BC community promotes anonymity as the default for any BC application in order to protect the 
privacy of the users. Because of the public visibility, the users' detailed activities could be 
reconstructed, if identities are not properly treated. The basic approach for anonymity in a BC system 
is to strictly abandon address reuse: an address can only be used for exactly one transaction, 
regardless of representing a receiver or a sender. Anonymity provides on-chain privacy [5]; 
transactional privacy is provided on the public BC, unless the contractual parties themselves voluntarily 
disclose information. 
In our scheme, we embrace the anonymity of the data owner, i.e the user of the data service. 
However, to enable auditability, we intentionally allow the reuse of service provider addresses. A 
service provider benefits from reusing an address for all activities related to a certain business, since a 
trackable history record of good performance helps marketing. On the other hand, if a potential 
customer is given a new address with no publicly available historical record, the customer could 
suspect misbehavior. 
SECTION VI. Conclusion and Future Work 
We propose an innovative approach for constructing a public ledger of policy compliance. In 
particularly, we introduce an off-chain channel called VOCMC to address the verification of external to 
the BC information. Apart from the verification of information when there is a combination of on-chain 
and off-chain system elements, the VOCMC also improves the scalability of the system by limiting on-
chain computation. The scenarios we considered are motivated by the privacy policy compliance issues 
that arise in a home setting including IoT devices and a social robot as a central controller. 
A potential attack to our scheme is the silent agreement. For example, a provider might make a deal 
with the customer so that a violation of the policies would not appear on the public ledger. A possible 
solution to this problem is to introduce into the VOCMC a witness who acts on behalf of the public 
interest. The challenge in this approach is to avoid the limitations that a centralized authority 
introduces. The mining nodes of the blockchain network are potential candidates for playing the role of 
the witness, but to leverage the nodes requires on-chain computation. 
While traditional regulation of privacy preservation (i.e. GDPR) focuses on control of customer data, 
the application of AI and IoT devices adds new dimensions of attacking surface that need an upgraded 
policy. For example, [28] describes a scenario of a hacked air-conditioner triggering another smart 
controller to open the windows. It is challenging to define policies for such context -dependent 
scenarios with pre-determined conditions. In addition, detection of this kind of misbehavior is based 
on non-deterministic algorithms. As future work, we plan to investigate the possibility of identifying 
policy semantic structures appropriate for this new type of privacy policies and then design a 
corresponding policy language and a verification mechanism to integrate with the public ledger. 
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